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Abstract  
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the government of Rwanda²much like other 
transitional regimes around the world²has prioritized reconciliation initiatives that 
educate civilians with a highly politicized understanding of the conflict, and encourage 
them to speak about the conflict and its aftermath in a manner that reinforces the 
legitimacy of the current government. However, individual survivors, bystanders, ex-
combatants and/or perpetrators of the genocide find various subtle ways to reinforce, 
resist or complicate the current official history. This article analyses a series of µiconic 
stories¶ that are repeated by Rwandans in different settings due to their historical and 
personal resonance for what they can tell us about the ethnic and political tensions that 
often continue to divide Rwandans and the overall challenges associated with everyday 
life since the genocide. Yet engaging with these iconic stories places the researcher in a 
difficult position where the democratizing potential of oral history is potentially 
undermined. This paper argues that even while qualitative researchers have an obligation 
to listen deeply to their informants, their moral and professional obligations to avoid 
reproducing narratives that promote potentially reprehensible agendas²for example, 
genocide denial²make contextualizing WKHLUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶QDUUatives in relation to the 
personal, historical, and political climate in which they are being produced essential.  
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µ7KHGDQJHURIDVLQJOHVWRU\¶LFRQLFVWRULHVLQSRVW-genocide Rwanda 
Introduction 
µ6WRULHVPDWWHU0DQ\VWRULHVPDWWHU6WRULHVKDYHEHHQXVHG to dispossess and malign, 
but stories can also be used to empower and humanize. Stories can break the dignity of a 
SHRSOHEXWVWRULHVFDQDOVRUHSDLUWKDWEURNHQGLJQLW\«,ZRXOGOLNHWRHQGZLWKWKLV
thought: that when we reject the single story, that when we realize that there is never a 
VLQJOHVWRU\DERXWDQ\SODFHZHUHJDLQDNLQGRISDUDGLVH«¶(Adichie, 2009).  
In recent years, the subject of collective memory has received much attention as scholars 
and practitioners affiliated with ethnography, oral history and related social science 
methodologies struggle to articulate the social, historical and political mechanisms that 
privilege certain memories and ways of remembering over others.1 Within the resulting 
body of literature, collective memory²also referenced as dominant, national, official, or 
public memory²is IUHTXHQWO\DSSURDFKHGDVµa formidable coercive process that induces 
the individual memory to FRDOHVFHZLWKWKHGRPLQDQWRQH¶ (Ryan, 2010: 159, referencing 
Thomson, 1994).  
Yet scratching the surface of this literature reveals criticisms that draw upon empirical 
and anecdotal evidence in support of the realization that at the individual level, the 
reception and internalization of collective memory is far from simple or uniform. For 
example, LorDLQQH5\DQDUJXHVWKDWµ>W@KHDQDO\VLVRIFROOHFWLYHPHPRU\
purely in terms of elites and hegemony mistakenly neglects the reception of the official 
PHPRU\¶+HULQYHVWLJDWLRQRIPQHPRQLFUHVLVWDQFH²individual or community acts of 
resistance to a collective memory narrative²reveals that while some individuals may 
adopt a narrative in the manner envisaged by political elites, for example, other 
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individuals will adapt the narrative to better mesh with their lived experiences and 
perspectives. Still others will reject the collective narrative outright. Similarly, Laura 
%DVX¶VDQDO\VLVRISUHVHQW-day remembrance of Australian outlaw and national hero, Ned 
.HOO\UHYHDOVKRZPHGLDWLRQWHPSRUDOLW\DQGSRZHULQWHUPLQJOHVXFKWKDWµ>H@QGXULQJ 
cultural memories are never made by politicians, monuments or individual media 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDORQH¶EXWDUHLQVWHDGµIRUPHGDQGGHYHORSWKURXJKDWDQJOHRIUHODWLRQV
WKDWUHDFKHVEDFNDQGIRUWKDFURVVWLPH¶WRGLUHFWO\DIIHFWQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\IRUPDWLon on 
an individual level (2011: 33). Likewise, )DUKDW6KDK]DG¶VVWXG\RIKRZ&DQDGLDQ\RXWK
construct collective memories surrounding the War on Terror offers similar insights. 
6KDK]DGILQGVFROOHFWLYHPHPRULHVDUHµPRUHG\QDPLFPXOWLSOHVKDUHGDQGFRQWHVted in 
WKHLUQDWXUH¶WKDQSUHYLRXVO\DUWLFXODWHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHDQGWKDWPHPEHUVRID
community can simultaneously be invested in multiple versions of an event according to 
the agency of the narrator, the material technologies available to them, and the social 
networks in which they are embedded (2012: 379). 
Given these recent critiques, an interrogation of collective memory as it relates to 
qualitative studies of mass atrocities and their aftermaths becomes crucial. In particular, 
scholars must be mindful about eliciting and reproducing dominant narratives that, while 
seemingly innocuous, are constructed in a manner that furthers political or ideological 
agendas, particularly those that might enhance divisions within a population, for example. 
As a starting point, this article anDO\VHVµLFRQLFVWRULHV¶²pervasive accounts that are 
internalized and recounted due to their personal and/or historical resonance for the 
narrator. This term was first introduced by Linda Shopes (2002: 9), who used it to 
encapsulaWHµFRQFUHWHVSHFLILFDFFRXQWVWKDW³VWDQGIRU´RUVXPXSVRPHWKLQJWKHQDUUDWRU
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UHFNRQVRISDUWLFXODUKLVWRULFDOLPSRUWDQFH¶WKDWDUHµSUHVHQWHGDVXQLTXHRUWRWHPLF
events and are communicated with FRQVLGHUDEOHHPRWLRQDOIRUFH¶To better express their 
personal importance, Sherna Berger Gluck (2013: 12) later expanded this term to include 
DQ\µDQHFGRWHWKDWUHVRQDWHVVRGHHSO\WKDWWKHQDUUDWRUDGRSWVLWDVKHURZQ¶ 
Iconic stories can pose certain challenges to the study of mass atrocities. To explore these 
challenges, the following discussion analyzes the deeper meaning of four iconic stories 
common to post-genocide Rwanda that were documented during three fieldwork trips 
between one and eight months in duration between 2007 and 2012. During these trips, I 
conducted²with help from research assistants fluent in Kinyarwanda²life history and 
thematic interviews with more than seventy Rwandans, including government officials, 
survivors, returnees, ex-combatants, convicted génocidaires, and bystanders.2 This 
fieldwork revealed the presence of common iconic stories among Rwandans from a range 
of regional, economic, and political backgrounds, revealing much about the dynamics 
surrounding collective memory and history in the aftermath of the genocide. I argue that 
while these iconic stories are important in their own right for revealing the ongoing 
political and ethnic tensions in post-genocide Rwanda, researchers must analyze them 
carefully within this wider context to avoid unwittingly reproducing reprehensible 
political agendas or negatively contributing to a political climate in which collective 
memory is conflated with identity and power, restricting public discourse to those 
narratives that aim to legitimize the current government (Ricouer, 2004; Ryan, 2010).  
Approaching post-genocide Rwanda 
Beginning in October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)²a political party 
composed primarily of militarized Tutsi refugees who had fled previous periods of ethnic 
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violence²invaded Rwanda from Uganda, triggering a civil war. The invasion was 
intended to force the government, then led by Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana, to 
accept a power-sharing agreement and recognize the right to return of Tutsi refugees of 
previous periods of viROHQFH+RZHYHUWKHLQYDVLRQUDGLFDOL]HGPDQ\RI5ZDQGD¶V+XWX
elites, whom in their efforts to undermine popular support for the RPF implemented a 
media campaign of anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi rhetoric and began training Hutu youth to 
defend their nation against the so-called foreign invaders²giving rise to the infamous 
µ+XWX3RZHU¶PRYHPHQW.3 
:LWKLQKRXUVRI+DE\DULPDQD¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQRQ$SULO+XWXyouth militias 
known as the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi set up roadblocks around Kigali 
while the Presidential Guard executed moderate Hutu and Tutsi politicians.4 Further 
exacerbating tensions, the notorious Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) 
broadcast allegations that the RPF was responsible and called upon the Hutu majority to 
avenge the death of their president. As the violence spread across those areas of Rwanda 
not yet under RPF control, ordinary Hutu civilians around Rwanda were encouraged to 
kill their Tutsi neighbors at roadblocks and in the churches, schools, and offices where 
they sought refuge. By the time the RPF wrestled control of the nation three months later, 
an estimated 400,000 to 800,000 civilians²most of whom were Rwandan Tutsi²had 
been massacred.5 
Since the genocide, President Paul Kagame²the current leader of the RPF²has been 
celebrated as the savior of the Rwandan people. First responders promoted an image of 
Kagame, and the RPF more generally, as a hardworking, benevolent force dedicated to 
the advancement of Rwanda.6 8QGHU.DJDPH¶VOHDGHUVKLSWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOcommunity 
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UHPDLQVLPSUHVVHGE\WKHKLJKGHJUHHRISROLWLFDOVWDELOLW\DQGWKH53)¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR
rapid progress in education, health care, and national unity and reconciliation.7  
However, more careful analysis recognizes the RPF to be a source of instability in the 
region. Several human rights organizations and experts have produced damaging reports 
detailing the lack of civil liberties and democratic reforms in Rwanda. The Kagame 
regime is criticized for muzzling genuine political opposition, tampering with election 
results, limiting freedom of expression and freedom of the press, harassing, torturing, and 
assassinating suspected political dissidents, and waging a proxy war in the DRC.8 
5ZDQGDQVZKRVSHDNRXWDJDLQVWWKH53)¶VKXPDQULJKWVDEXVHVULVNJRYernment 
harassment, illegal detention and imprisonment, and in extreme cases, assassination, 
resulting in a growing political opposition in exile. As a result, 5ZDQGD¶VSROLWLFDO
climate is tense and many civilians justifiably fear their government. 
This climate has led several scholars to approach post-genocide Rwanda as a highly 
SROLWLFL]HGVHWWLQJZKHUHLQWKHJRYHUQPHQWµH[HUWVVLJQLILFDQWFRQWURORYHUVRFLRSROLWLFDO
discourses and seeks to control what people can say about the government and its 
policiHV¶%XUQHW-HVVHH/RQJPDQ3RWWLHU7KRPVRQ
20). The RPF, much like previous regimes, has established an official history that is 
disseminated to the public through an ambitious program of nationalized 
commemoration, school curricula and the media (Burnet, 2012; Desrosiers and Thomson, 
2011). Rwandans who express their disapproval in public settings run the risk of being 
labeled political subversives, genocide deniers or terrorists resulting in political and/or 
legal persecution (Longman, 2011; Republic of Rwanda, 2008, 2001; Purdeková, 2011).  
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Conducting fieldwork under these circumstances can be a tense and risky endeavor. The 
narratives that inform this article have emerged from ethnographic and oral historical 
fieldwork conducted in Rwanda since 2007. In terms of ethnography, I have periodically 
LPPHUVHGP\VHOILQHYHU\GD\OLIHLQ5ZDQGDWRHOLFLWDµYLHZIURPEHORZ¶UHJDUGLQJWKH
challenges facing Rwandans, particularly in rural communities.9 This approach facilitated 
a thorough understanding of how Rwandans²the majority of whom adhere to some form 
of Christianity²negotiate traditions and taboos surrounding death and dying, mourning, 
and the handling of the dead, both in times of peace and in periods of ethnic and political 
YLROHQFH,WKDVDOVRPDGHYLVLEOHWKHµDPSOLILHGVLOHQFHV¶WKDW5ZDQGDQQHJRWLDWHRQD
daily basis to ensure they remain in good standing with the government.10 
This approach was enhanced by conducting multiple interviews with individual 
participants. Initial encounters took the form of life history interviews, during which 
participants took the lead in describing their lives in as little or as much detail as they felt 
necessary. Once they were satisfied with their life history, we would shift to thematic 
interviews during which I asked questions specific to my research interests. I then 
contextualized their responses in relation to their life histories and relevant ethnographic 
data I had collected. The use of life histories as a starting point for understanding the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶lived experiences gradually made visible the politics of history navigated by 
many Rwandans since the genocide. 
While many Rwandans freely participate in foreign research projects on controversial 
topics, it is unethical for foreign researchers to disseminate the resulting narratives 
without discussing with participants and research assistants how to effectively 
minimizing harm for them. For this reason, many of the interviews and casual 
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conversations upon which this article is based were not²at the request of my 
participants²recorded, and have been reconstructed from fieldnotes. In other instances, 
transcripts translated from Kinyarwanda to English are used to retain as much as possible 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶original words and meanings. To maintain confidentiality, I use pseudonyms 
in most references to participants and refrain from discussing any personally identifying 
information in my publications.  
The resulting narratives have been analyzed in relation to the social, political and 
historical contexts in which they were produced. To this end, storytelling in post-
genocide Rwanda can be an inherently political act. Faced with decades of historical 
revisionism under different regimes, many Rwandans want to set the record straight 
according to their lived experiences and the wealth of oral traditions in which they were 
HPEHGGHG2QPXOWLSOHRFFDVLRQVSDUWLFLSDQWVLQVLVWHGRQH[SODLQLQJ5ZDQGD¶Vµreal 
KLVWRU\¶DVWKHLUFRQGLWLRQIRUFRQWULEXWLQJWRWKLVUHVHDUFh. However, I quickly realized 
that rather than escaping the historical revisionism I associated with the various regimes 
that have ruled Rwanda, I was simply exposing additional, personalized layers of 
historical revisionism. 
Thus, at minimum the iconic stories emerging from post-genocide Rwanda needed to be 
analyzed in relation to the life history of individual narrators, and the surrounding social, 
historical, and political climate. Furthermore, whereas many oral histories of mass 
atrocities focus primarily on survivors¶QDUUDWLYHV, engaging with the narratives of 
génocidaires, ex-combatants, and other parties to the conflict becomes crucial. In post-
genocide Rwanda, failure to do so puts the researcher at risk of privileging narratives that 
reinforce the current official history, silencing discussion of the various forms of 
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suffering endured by Rwandans surrounding the genocide and contributing to a powerful 
reservoir of ethnic and political tensions among Rwandans. 
Contextualizing the plethora of stories that greet researchers is far from an easy task, 
particularly for foreigners. As outsiders to Rwanda, foreign researchers are faced with 
steep cultural and political learning curves, and their ability to navigate them with any 
degree of success largely depends on the gatekeepers and informants who serve as their 
first points of contact, helping to vet research questions and in-country partner 
organizations, inform ethics protocol, and even recruit research assistants and participants 
(Jessee, 2012). Broadly speaking, those who work closely with government organizations 
based in Kigali, for example, often tend to internalize a view of post-genocide Rwanda 
that is largely complementary²one that recognizes that the Kagame regime is 
maintaining tight control over Rwandan civil society, but justifies this control as 
necessary to ensure long-term peace, political stability, and economic development of the 
nation. Among those foreign researchers who work closely with rural communities, 
however, a contradictory perspective often emerges²one that highlights the tensions and 
dangers that inform everyday life in Rwanda, often attributed to the Rwandan 
government and the rumored network of spies it maintains. Under these circumstances, 
what then constitutes a highly politicized or divisive narrative can vary dramatically. 
In my case, I had multiple first points of contact as the research project from which this 
article emerges involved working not only with government officials, but staff at the 
state-funded genocide memorials, rural survivors, convicted génocidaires and 
community-based organization officials around Rwanda.11 An average day of fieldwork 
typically involved meetings and interviews with Rwandans who maintained vastly 
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different perspectives on the genocide and its aftermath. Given these somewhat unusual 
circumstances, I often relied upon research assistants and participants to guide me in 
determining which narratives might prove problematic if disseminated to the public 
without adequate contextualization. I asked the research assistants with whom I worked 
to mention as part of their translation if they felt a particular story being recounted by a 
participant was inaccurate or perhaps being recast in a problematic manner so I could 
make note of this and discuss it at a later point. Likewise, by conducting multiple 
interviews with each participant, I had ample opportunities to ask their perspectives on 
the narratives I was encountering, which allowed me to better understand the political and 
personal symbolic capital attributed to them. In doing so, I made it clear that my interest 
in these problematic narratives was not to condemn people for constructing lies, for 
example, but rather to ensure I provided adequate context so as to avoid unwittingly 
legitimating a version of events that could prove distressing or promote further tensions 
among Rwandans. For even if a research assistant or participant found a particular 
narrative morally reprehensible, I recognized that this did not mean the narrative was not 
still valuable for revealing what a particular individual held to be psychologically true 
(Laub, 1992). 
Iconic stories in post-genocide Rwanda 
Having established the methodological and ethical foundation underlying this article, I 
will now consider four iconic stories commonly narrated by Rwandans that are 
particularly helpful for demonstrating the challenges inherent in narrative analysis in the 
post-genocide period. The first two iconic stories had great personal resonance for the 
participants who narrated them, while the third and four iconic stories are more important 
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for their historical resonance. In addition to revealing the everyday political and ethnic 
tensions that persist in the post-genocide period, these narratives encode subtle resistance 
to the current official history²µWKHJHQRFLGHRIWKH7XWVL¶ as it is labeled in official 
parlance.12 Taken together, I argue that Rwandans are constantly adapting iconic stories 
to reflect their individual lived experiences and political agendas, which in turn expose 
the subtle ethnic and political tensions impacting post-genocide Rwanda. 
Iconic story #1: µ,¶OOQHYHUEH7XWVLDJDLQ¶ 
The Kigali Genocide Memorial Center (KGMC) houses a photo exhibit dedicated to 
children who were murdered during the 1994 genocide. One photograph shows a smiling 
child whose last words are cited DVµ,¶OOQHYHUEH7XWVLDJDLQ¶²a stark reminder of the 
brutality of the genocide and the injustices and indignities inflicted upon unarmed 
civilians, particularly children. Within the wider context of the exhibit, however, it is 
damning evidence against the Hutu majority, who are depicted throughout as having been 
manipulated by Hutu Power extremists into supporting and even directly participating in 
the torture, murder, and mutilation of their Tutsi compatriots.13  
During casual conversations and interviews with survivors and returnees, the origins of 
the words²µ,¶ll QHYHUEH7XWVLDJDLQ¶²were frequently attributed to the child victims of 
the genocide in a given area, often the child of a relative or friend. The accompanying 
VWRU\ZDVDOZD\VVKDUHGLQDVLPLODUFRQWH[WKLJKOLJKWLQJWZRSRLQWV)LUVWWKHFKLOG¶V
confusion regarding his or her ethnicity²that being a Tutsi was not something an 
individual could choose, but rather inherited patrilineally²HPSKDVL]HGWKHFKLOG¶V
innocence. This in turn HPSKDVL]HGWKHDWWDFNHUV¶YHKHPHQWKDWUHGRI7XWVL²a hatred so 
irrational that even a child could not be spared. Such violence is taboo in Rwanda, where 
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women and children are described as nyampinga, a term that expresses their innocence 
and inability to inflict suffering upon others.  
Augustin, an elderly survivor who had experienced several periods of ethnic and political 
violence in his community noted that: µIn our culture, a child is considered an angel 
because of his innocence. Children were protected not only by their parents, but by every 
DGXOWDURXQG¶ Other participants referred to children as treasures that were the pride and 
responsibility of the whole community, not just their immediate families. In this context, 
the fact that any Rwandan could kill a child from their community, let alone a child who 
had no understanding as to why he or she is being killed, is not only evocative, but also 
stigmatizes those who were involved²shame that is cast upon the Hutu masses in 
general.14 As such, within Rwanda this iconic story resonates particularly strongly with 
survivors and returnees who have suffered intimate losses surrounding the genocide, 
while alienating the Hutu majority. 
This iconic story has been reproduced beyond Rwanda as well, further demonstrating to 
its relevance. For example, Samantha Power (2003: 334) recounts the story of a child 
who was murdered under nearly identical circumstances:  
Because the Hutu and Tutsi had lived intermingled, and in many instances, intermarried, 
the outbreak of killing forced Hutu and Tutsi friends and relatives into life-altering 
decisions about whether or not to desert their loved ones in order to save their own lives. 
At Mugonero Church in the town of Kibuye, two Hutu sisters, each married to a Tutsi 
husband, faced such a choice. One of the women decided to die with her husband. The 
other, who hoped to save the lives of her eleven children, chose to leave. Because her 
husband was Tutsi, her children had been categorized as Tutsi and thus were technically 
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forbidden to live. But the machete-wielding Hutu attackers had assured the woman that 
the children would be permitted to depart safely if she agreed to accompany them. When 
the woman stepped out of the church, however, she saw the assailants butcher eight of the 
eleven children. The youngest, a child of three years old, pleaded for his life after seeing 
KLVEURWKHUVDQGVLVWHUVVODLQ³3OHDVHGRQ¶WNLOOPH´KHVDLG³,¶OOQHYHUEH7XWVL
DJDLQ´%XWWKHNLOOHUVXQEOLQNLQJVWUXFNKLPGRZQ 
3RZHU¶VYHUVLRQGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHVWRU\¶VLFRQLFTXDOLW\EH\RQG5ZDQGD,Widentifies 
Tutsi victims and Hutu perpetrators, implying²given the conflict is clearly between two 
ethnic groups²that signatories to the United Nations Genocide Convention should have 
prevented the genocide²an LPSRUWDQWSRLQWJLYHQKHUERRN¶VRYHUDUFKLQJcriticism of the 
US gRYHUQPHQW¶VIDLOXUHWRSUHYHQWJHQRFLGHLQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\15 And once again, 
the innocence of the child is paramount, as is his brutal murder, reinforcing the 
genocide¶VEUXWDOLW\ amid WKH+XWXSHUSHWUDWRUV¶deep-seated hatred of the Tutsi.  
However, demonstrating the dynamic, shared and contested nature of iconic stories, and 
FROOHFWLYHPHPRU\PRUHJHQHUDOO\3RZHU¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHVWRU\GLYHUJHVIURPWKDWRIthe 
survivors and returnees whom I interviewed in important ways. First, Power alludes to 
RZDQGDQV¶pre-genocide intermingling, perhaps to emphasize the irrationality of the 
Hutu extremisWV¶KDWUHGRIWKH7XWVLE\GHSLFWLQJ an ethnocentrism so powerful that even 
partial Tutsi heritage justified a death sentence. Second, Power emphasizes the choiceless 
decisions faced by many Hutu civilians as they chose between survival and the desertion 
of their loved ones or death at the hands of the génocidaires. This framing creates space 
for a side of the story rarely voiced publically in Rwanda²one where not all Hutu 
committed murder, but instead refused to participate, rescued Tutsi at great personal risk, 
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or acted simultaneously as génocidaires and rescuers, killing those Tutsi they did not 
know or with whom they had a history of interpersonal conflict, while hiding Tutsi 
friends and family (Jessee, 2015)3RZHU¶VQDUUDWLYHKLQWVDWDPRUHFRPSOH[UHODWLRQVKLS
between Hutu and Tutsi civilians, and even among Hutu, during the genocide. 
Unsurprisingly, this iconic story was completely absent from génoFLGDLUHV¶narratives. 
Due to the cultural taboos against harming children and the legal consequences of 
acknowledging complicity in such atrocities, génocidaires²men and women alike²
rarely discussed violence against children.16 They unanimously claimed to be against the 
killing of children, and argued that such atrocities did not occur in their communities 
during the genocide.17 This tendency likely emerged from the fact that many génocidaires 
had learned through participation in transitional justice programs like ingando and gacaca 
that there were harsher legal and social consequences for admitting to such crimes, 
making them far more taboo than other forms of violence.18  
In general conversations about symbolic violence, however, génocidaires were more 
forthcoming, acknowledging that their superiors sometimes encouraged the killing of 
children. To this end, an iconic story narrated by several génocidaires told RI.DJDPH¶V
escape from Rwanda DVDEDE\RQKLVPRWKHU¶VEDFNduring the 1959 Hutu Revolution. 
Valérie Bemeriki²formerly an infamous RTLM radio host²recalled that Hutu Power 
extremists used this story to emphasize the necessity of eliminating all Tutsi this time 
around.19 Having escaped Rwanda in 1959, as a refugee in Uganda Kagame was 
educated, given military training, and connected with other politically active Rwandan 
refugees whom would eventually form the RPF. According to RTLM propaganda, 
Kagame then returned to Rwanda decades later to murder Habyarimana, undermine 
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Rwandan democracy, and re-enslave the Hutu majority.20 The RTLM used this story of 
.DJDPH¶VRULJLQVas an example of what was at stake for the Hutu if they failed, once 
again, to eliminate the Tutsi threat. 
According to several génocidaires from different regions, high-level Hutu Power 
H[WUHPLVWVUHFRXQWHGWKHVWRU\RI.DJDPH¶VFKLOGKRRGHVFDSHWRHQFRXUDJHWKHPWo kill 
all Tutsi²and especially children. If they failed to do so, another Kagame might rise up 
from among the genocide survivors to threaten the Hutu Power movement anew. 
Constructed in this manner, génocidaires employed the story as a means of justifying the 
murder of Tutsi children, as well as expressing their disapproval of Kagame and the RPF, 
who from the perspective of many had successfully re-HQVODYHG5ZDQGD¶V+XWXPDMRULW\
in the post-genocide period.  
Iconic story #2: The impaled woman 
A second iconic story emerged circulated around the Nyamata memorial, where an 
estimated 2,500 Tutsi civilians were massacred during the genocide. As part of the tour, 
memorial guides often accompany visitors into a crypt in the center of the church where 
they recount the story of a young Tutsi mother. During the massacre, the attackers took 
her into the church courtyard, along with a handful of other beautiful Tutsi women. The 
attackers took turns raping these women, all the while talking about how this was the 
only way they could have sex with Tutsi women and how it proved Tutsi women were 
not so superior after all.21 The women were then killed. However, the young mother was 
subject to a particularly brutal form of execution. Her attackers impaled her vagina and 
breasts with sharpened sticks, and threw her body²along with that of her child²into the 
church latrine. Their remains were recovered a few years later when local survivors 
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decided the time had come to give the victims a more respectful burial. Unlike the other 
YLFWLPVKRZHYHUWKLVSDUWLFXODUZRPDQ¶VERG\DOOHJHGO\VKRZHGQRVLJQVRI
decomposition. For this reason, the local community honors her as a saint whose sexual 
assault and murder are further evidence of the excessive brutality of the Hutu extremists. 
Rwandan survivors from the surrounding community speak often of this woman and 
others who shared a similar fate in speaking about the genocide. Several survivors 
described female family members or friends who were killed in a comparable manner, 
both at Nyamata church and elsewhere in the region. Their preoccupation with this iconic 
story conveys three messages about thHJHQRFLGH)LUVWWKHZRPDQ¶VLQQRFHQFHLV
paramount. In the context of Rwandan culture, her gender, combined with her status as a 
mother and her decision to seek refuge at the church, should have afforded her protection. 
Survivors always stressed that in previous periods of political and ethnic violence in 
Rwanda, women and children who sought refuge at churches were spared. Second, the 
manner in which she was tortured and murdered by the Hutu extremists emphasizes their 
violently ethnocentric beliefs. This relates to a third important message, whereby 
survivors frequently argued that the Hutu extremists had internalized a particularly 
vehement hatred for Tutsi women in particular, because they allegedly used their superior 
beauty to enslave Hutu men (Malkki, 1995). Survivors offered this explanation to make 
sense of why Tutsi women were subject to humiliating, overtly sexual forms of torture 
and murder during the genocide.  
For example, in attempting to make sense of this phenomenon, Venant ± another elderly 
survivor ± recalled:  
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It was sheer wickedness. It was meant to wipe out the Tutsi in the most atrocious way. 
Hutu women disliked Tutsi women. They felt Tutsi women took away their husbands by 
seducing them. In reality, Hutu men longed for Tutsi women because of their beauty. 
When they did not marry them, they would keep them as concubines. 
Interpersonal conflicts may have been a contributing factor, however. Serafina²a 
survivor from Nyamata²mentioned that prior to the genocide, the impaled woman had 
had a bad reputation. She was proud of her exceptional beauty, and had rejected several 
Hutu suitors specifically because she saw them as inferior and wanted a Tutsi husband. 
While this by no means justifies the brutal treatment she endured, Serafina mentioned this 
aspect of her personality as an explanation for why the ZRPDQ¶Vattackers singled her out 
for such a brutal death.  
*pQRFLGDLUHV¶narratives reinforced the possibility that such extreme violence served a 
symbolic purpose, as well as a functional one. As indicated above, violence against 
women is taboo within Rwandan culture. Thus, this particular iconic story and the 
brutality it relates, while likely familiar, was never mentioned. Only a handful of the 
génocidaires I interviewed ever admitted to participating in attacks on Tutsi women, 
WKRXJKWKHLUIUHTXHQWUHIHUHQFHVWRZRPHQWKH\KDGµUHVFXHG¶PD\KDYHEHHQDVXEWOH
way of acknowledging the widespread practice of sexual slavery and forced marriage 
during the genocide (Baines, 2003; Carpenter, 2000; Des Forges, 1999; Sharlach, 2000).  
However, in general conversations about symbolic violence, impalement was 
occasionally discussed as an appropriate means of killing Tutsi women. Several 
génocidaires complained that Tutsi women were too proud of their beauty and acted as 
though they were superior to their Hutu neighbors. For example, Alexandre recalled that 
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GXULQJWKHJHQRFLGHSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQWKHPXUGHURIRQH¶V7XWVLQHLJKERUVJDYHWKH
attackers free reign to use theLUYLFWLPV¶ZRPHQµDVWRROV¶²a powerful incentive for 
rural men who had grown up believing that Tutsi women were unavailable to them 
because of their superiority. A woman génocidaire, Egidie, expanded on this by noting 
that rape, as well as the various forms of gender-based violence that accompanied it, such 
as breast oblation, impalement, and leaving YLFWLPV¶ bodies naked in the streets, was a 
means of giving Tutsi women the dishonorable deaths they deserved. Still other 
génocidaires expressed mystification about Tutsi women, noting that they were rumoured 
to have physiologically differences that made them better sexual partners than Hutu 
women, making them a commodity that only elite Hutu men could afford. Michel²a 
salesman who committed a range of atrocities during the genocide²noted he and many 
RIWKHPHQZLWKZKRPKHDWWDFNHGKDGDµFXULRVLW\¶DERXW7XWVLZRPHQKDYLQJJURZQXS
hearing stories about how they were better sexual partners. In this context, génocidaires 
argued that rape, impalement, and other forms of gender-based violence were often 
framed as an appropriate means of showing Tutsi women that they were no better than 
their Hutu compatriots.22  
Iconic story #3: The evil monarch 
The current RIILFLDOKLVWRU\FKDPSLRQV5ZDQGD¶s pre-colonial period as a utopian era 
when all Rwandans were united by a monarchy. For example, among its many 
V\PEROLFDOO\SRWHQWIHDWXUHVWKH.*0&KRVWVDµ*DUGHQRI8QLW\¶WKDWDFFRUGLQJWRWKH
2011 audio tour, represented WKHµ5ZDQGDRIDQFLHQWWLPHs, when the country was united 
DQGDWSHDFH¶(OVHZKHUHLQWKHH[KLELWDQGLQRWKHU5ZDQGDQcultural and historical 
institutions, such as the Ethnographic Museum in Huye (Butare), this peace is attributed 
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to the strong, egalitarian leadership of the Rwandan monarchy, which is generally 
depicted as unanimously loved by the people, including those neighboring territories and 
communities that Rwanda sought to absorb into its borders to increase its regional 
power.23 The policies of the German and Belgian colonizers are held solely responsible 
for the ethnic and political tensions that would later divide Rwandans according to 
ethnicity, and little attention is paid to the regional, political, socio-economic and clan 
divisions that existed previously. 
Throughout iWVKLVWRU\5ZDQGD¶VPRQDUFK\ZDVDSUHGRPLQDQWO\7XWVLLQVWLWXWLRQ.LQJV
came from the Abanyiginya clan and mostly married women from the matridynastic 
Abega, Abaha and Abakono clans to ensure stable political alliances between those 
families that exercised the greatest political influence and regional power (Mukarutabana, 
2012). While all clans included Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, the matridynastic clans were 
separate from the three clans associated with the Hutu majority²the Abazibaga, 
Abagesera, and Abasinga ²whose members engaged in direct contact with the earth for 
ritual and subsistence purposes without risking pollution (Newbury, 2009; Taylor, 1992).  
Yet despite the potential for inter-ethnic collaboration, collective memory within Rwanda 
recalls the monarchy as a fundamentally Tutsi institution. Furthermore, in discussing the 
PRQDUFK\5ZDQGDQVRIWHQUHIHUHQFHµWKHNLQJ¶DVWKRXJKWKHLQVWLWXWLRQKDGEHHQruled 
by only one leader, rather than the countless kings, court officials, and political intimates 
who had exercised power over the centuries (Jessee and Watkins, 2014). But this was 
where similarities between narratives ended, and ethnic and political divisions became 
more apparent.  
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Among génocidaires, the Tutsi king was typically portrayed as evil²responsible for 
maintaining the economic, political, and ritual supremacy of the Tutsi minority at the 
expense of the Hutu majority. For example, Michel repeaWHGO\GHVFULEHG5ZDQGD¶VSUH-
colonial past as characterized by the enslavement of the Hutu majority. He cited many 
family stories about how the Tutsi had abused the Hutu. For example, he claimed the 
Tutsi used their cattle²a status symbol in Rwandan society that persists today²to 
enslave the Hutu. Referencing a practice called ubuhake, Michel recalled that the Hutu 
had labored long hours in difficult conditions for a Tutsi patron in exchange for 
temporary access to a cow and the hope, often misguided, of social advancement.24  
But in addition to examples of everyday structural violence endured by Hutu in the pre-
colonial and colonial periods, Michel was particularly enthusiastic in discussing the 
abuses of the Tutsi king, specifically. He described how the Tutsi king used to execute 
Hutu men who displeased him and hang their testicles on the royal drum Karinga, which 
in combination with the annual cycle of rituals performed by the court ritualists, formed 
the symbolic basis of monarchical legitimacy (Newbury, 1991). Michel was similarly 
incensed by a story of a king who stood by planting his spear in the bodies of Hutu 
children for support, resulting in their deaths.  
Philippe²a former history teacher²related a similar story. However, where other 
génocidaires claimed it was the king who had stabbed Hutu children with his spear in 
RUGHUWRVXSSRUWKLPVHOIZKLOHKHVWRRG3KLOLSSH¶VDFFRXQWFODLPHGWKH7XWVL4XHHQ
Mother used to murder Hutu babies by stabbing them with her sword to support herself 
when she stood. Philippe was quick to accuse Rwandan women in general of poisoning 
people or manipulating their husbands and other male family members to commit morally 
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reprehensible acts on their behalf, revealing a preoccupation with Rwandan women as 
conspirators, manipulators, and poisoners. His decision to attribute this behavior to the 
Queen Mother may have been rooted in his distrust of Rwandan women, perhaps 
emerging from his affiliation with the Hutu Power movement, which condemned Tutsi 
women for using their superior beauty, intelligence and good manners to trick Hutu men 
into servitude (Malkki, 1995). It may also have been informed by his knowledge of 
Kanjogera, a notorious Queen Mother who orchestrated the suicide of her adopted son 
King Rutarindwa during the coup of Rucunshu in 1896, and then proceeded to massacre 
anyone who opposed her, to make her son, Musinga, king (Des Forges, 2011, Newbury, 
1988).  
Iconic stories about to the evil Tutsi monarch were repeated by génocidaires across 
Rwanda to explain their participation in the genocide and demonstrate the need for Hutu 
resistance. 7KHVHLFRQLFVWRULHVDERXWWKHNLQJ¶VV\VWHPLFDEXVHVRISRZHUZHUHJURXQGHG
in claims regarding the systemic dehumanization of the Hutu prior to the colonial period. 
However, génocidaires often described the RPF and its treatment of the Hutu majority as 
a modern incarnation of the Tutsi monarchy. They wrongly claimed that Kagame was 
descended from the Abanyiginya clan, which they cited as evidence that Rwanda was in 
the grips of a new incarnation of the Tutsi monarchy.25 Such sentiments were influenced 
by personal experiences of mass atrocities perpetrated by RPF troops and the education 
that many génocidaires had received under the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, as 
well as the narratives that were transmitted within their families.26  
Among survivors and returnees, however, the king was remembered in more positive 
terms as someone who had fought for the expansion of Rwanda and the equality of all 
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Rwandans. Survivors and returnees RQO\UHIHUHQFHGWKHNLQJ¶VRSSUHVVLRQRIWKH+XWXWR
question its historical accuracy. In doing so, they condemned the irrationality of the Hutu 
extremists and the Hutu majority, more generally, for having been blinded by violent 
ethnocentrism. Augustin acknowledged the story of the king who stood by planting his 
spear in the bodies of Hutu children for support, but countered with his analysis²that 
while individual members of the monarchy could be positive or negative, it was 
ultimately a benevolent force in the lives of Rwandan civilians, regardless of their ethnic 
RUSROLWLFDODIILOLDWLRQ+HFRQFOXGHGµThe king was seen as being above ethnic rivalry 
and seen by his people as being fair to everybody. The Belgians were the ones opposing 
the people to their NLQJ¶ ,Q$XJXVWLQ¶VRSLQLRQWKRVHZKRFODLPHGRWKHUZLVHZHUH
JHQRFLGHGHQLHUVZKRVHH[LVWHQFHMXVWLILHGWKH53)¶VGHFLVLRQWRPX]]OHWKHSROLWLFDO
opposition and restrict civil liberties.  
But much like the génocidaires, Augustin was personally invested in this subject. He was 
descended from the monarchy, and prior to independence, his family had enjoyed 
substantial political power in their community. Furthermore, as a survivor who had nearly 
died at the hands of Hutu extremists on several occasions since Rwandan independence, 
and whose extended family had been exterminated during the genocide, he harbored 
misgivings about his Hutu neighbors, most of whom he argued had escaped justice by 
successfully denying their complicity in the genocide. And like many Rwandan 
survivors, he believed that future ethnic and political violence was inevitable. While 
RYHUDOOKHGLGQRWDSSURYHRIWKH53)¶VVW\OHRIOHDGHUVKLSZKLFKKHFRQWHQGHG
SULYLOHJHG7XWVLUHWXUQHHVRYHUµUHDO5ZDQGDQV¶KHQRQHWKHOHVVEHOLHYHGWKDWWKe RPF 
alone could prevent a resurgence of political and ethnic violence. 
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Iconic story #4: The good muzungu 
A final iconic story relates the death of Antonia Locatelli, an Italian nun. She is buried at 
Nyamata memorial, where she is commemorated as the one muzungu who spoke out 
DJDLQVWWKH+DE\DULPDQDUHJLPH¶VFRQVFLRXVQHJOHFWRI7XWVLFLYLOLDQVLQWKHHDUO\
1990s.27 When government-supported violence forced Tutsi civilians to seek refuge at 
Nyamata church, where they were denied food, water, and other necessities, Locatelli 
alerted the international media. Soon after, a government soldier allegedly lured Locatelli 
from her house in the middle of the night and shot her.  
/RFDWHOOL¶VVWRU\LVUHSOLFDWed within and beyond Rwanda. Following her assassination, 
Amnesty International (1992) demanded a formal investigation of LoFDWHOOL¶VPXUGHU as 
part of a larger effort to force the Habyarimana regime to cease the persecution of 
Rwandan Tutsi. Her sacrifice is formally recognized by Gardens of the Righteous 
Worldwide (GARIWO), an Italy-based organization that documents individuals who 
µZKRKDYHWULHGRUDUHWU\LQJWRSUHYHQWFULPHVRIJHQRFLGHWRGHIHQGKXPDQULJKWVLQ
extreme situations, or that struggle to safeguard memory from the recurring attempts to 
GHQ\WKHWUXWKDERXWWKHSHUVHFXWLRQV¶*$5,:2 
7KHVWRU\VXUURXQGLQJ/RFDWHOOL¶VGHDWKLVLPSRUWDQWLQWKHFRQWH[WRISRVW-genocide 
Rwanda for two reasons. First, memorial staff and local government officials cite the 
circumstances surrounding her death as evidence that WKH+DE\DULPDQDUHJLPH¶VSODQned 
to commit genocide as early as 1992. The region where she worked is portrayed as a test 
case in which the Habyarimana regime took advantage of a naturally occurring drought 
and famine to decimate its Tutsi population by withholding aid. When this more subtle 
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method of genocide via neglect failed, the Habyarimana regime resorted to more direct 
tactics²civilians armed with machetes.  
Second, Locatelli waVIUHTXHQWO\KHUDOGHGDVµDgood PX]XQJX¶. Unlike the rest of the 
international community, which refused to intervene when genocide overwhelmed 
Rwanda, Locatelli acted despite great personal risk. She had not only recognized the 
severity of the state neglect inflicted upon the Tutsi, but she used her status to bring 
much-needed international attention to their plight. Many local survivors argue the 
genocide began in 1992, and that Locatelli was among its first victims. Thus, she was 
given an honorary burial at Nyamata church.   
However, as my fieldwork in Rwanda progressed, I began to suspect this story was 
intended to communicate another message. Locatelli was murdered because she spoke 
out against the Habyarimana regime²a government that according to the R3)¶VRIILFLDO
narrative was notable for its corruption and willingness to murder Rwandan Tutsi to 
distract the nation from the real problems plaguing its development. Yet, my Rwandan 
participants and colleagues consistently noted the similarities between the Habyarimana 
and Kagame regimes, particularly regarding their treatment of perceived political 
dissidents.28 One of my research assistants often joked that from the perspective of the 
Kagame regime, the only good muzungu was a dead muzungu²one that had learned to 
keep her mouth shut about the human rights abuses that surrounded her. As part of our 
debriefing sessions, when faced with my growing interest in politically charged versions 
of 5ZDQGD¶VKLVWRU\KHIUHTXHQWO\UHPLQGHGPHWRµUHPHPEHUZKDWKDSSHQHd to the 
,WDOLDQ¶ 
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)RUWKHVHUHDVRQV,EHJDQWRLQWHUSUHW/RFDWHOOL¶VVWRU\DVDZDUQLQJWRIRUHLJQHUVOLNH
myself that despite our international status, we too were vulnerable to government 
persecution²a warning that has proved prescient over the years as more and more 
foreign researchers have found themselves unwelcome in Rwanda.29 Perhaps this 
H[SODLQHGZK\VRPDQ\SDUWLFLSDQWVUHSHDWHG/RFDWHOOL¶VVWRU\LQP\SUHVHQFH6KHKDG
sought to delegitimize the Habyarimana regime at a time when it enjoyed a high degree 
of international approval, and had been silenced for her efforts, just like many of 
.DJDPH¶VFULWLFVVLQFHKLVRIILFLDOULVHWRRIILFHLQ'HVURVLHUVDQG7KRPVRQ
7KXV,PXVWFRQVLGHUWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW/RFDWHOOL¶VVWRU\ZDVDOVRLntended to 
communicate the necessity of balancing caution and silence on politically sensitive topics 
in the post-genocide period, for foreign researchers and Rwandans alike. 
Conclusion 
I began this paper with a quote by Chimamanda Adichie, in which she warns of the 
dangers of a single story, and celebrates the paradise that can be regained by creating 
space for many stories, whether recounting similar or vastly different events or 
experiences. Inspired by her words, I have selected four iconic stories prevalent in post-
genocide Rwanda that taken individually²as single stories²could be used by different 
people to promote personal political agendas and assert a range of reprehensible moral 
judgments. I have then analyzed these narratives in an effort to articulate the individual 
political, social, and historical contexts that influenced their telling and dissemination in 
post-genocide Rwanda. This analysis raises certain questions: what can be gained from 
engaging with and reproducing iconic stories that emerge in highly politicized research 
settings, such as the aftermath of mass atrocities? And in the context of oral history and 
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its overarching mission to µdemocratize history,¶ what are the limitations related to 
creating space for these stories?  
This paper represents a starting point for addressing these questions. I have demonstrated 
that analyzing iconic stories for their deeper personal and historical meaning reveals the 
myriad ways that stories are internalized and adapted to encode important information 
UHJDUGLQJ5ZDQGD¶VFXUUHQWSROLWLFDOFOLPDWHDQGthe persistence of ethnic and political 
divisions among Rwandans. This is particularly evident in the personal iconic stories, 
which were repeatedly used by survivors and returnees to emphasize the depravity, 
ignorance, and violent ethnocentrism of the Hutu majority, while justifying their 
OLQJHULQJGLVWUXVWRIWKHLU+XWXFRPSDWULRWVDQGWKHQHFHVVLW\RIWKH53)¶VDXWKRULWDULDQ
approach to governance. Yet the narratives of génocidaires suggest that the violence that 
targeted Tutsi during the genocide was not irrational. Conversely, even the torture and 
murder of Tutsi women and children was carefully justified according to iconic stories 
that reveal a perceived history of Hutu oppression and persecution under Tutsi leadership 
and a fear of allowing a new Tutsi hegemony to power in Rwanda. Under the 
circumstances, the researcher is obligated to contextualize these narratives in relation to 
the lived experiences and political agenda of the narrators, regardless of their ethnicity or 
status relative to the genocide, to avoid further reproducing narratives that could foster 
misperceptions among the international community, as well as further ethnic and political 
divisions among Rwandans.  
The historical iconic stories regarding the evil nature of the Tutsi monarchy and the good 
muzungu further demonstrate the ethnic and political tensions affecting post-genocide 
Rwanda. *pQRFLGDLUHV¶narratives of the brutal excesses of the Tutsi monarchy were 
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frequently narrated in a manner that sought to justify their involvement in unspeakable 
acts of cruelty toward their Tutsi compatriots and revealed the ongoing brutality of the 
RPF toward its Hutu subjects. This lengthy history of Hutu oppression was well-known 
to survivors, particularly those who had been educated under the Kayibanda and 
Habyarimana regimes, but was quickly dismissed as further evidence of the ignorance 
and violent ethnocentrism maintained by the Hutu majority²a much more comforting 
option that acknoZOHGJLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW5ZDQGD¶VSDVWDQGSUHVHQWZHUHSODJXHG
by social, economic, ethnic and political inequalities that privileged the Tutsi minority at 
the expense of the Hutu majority. Likewise, the story of the good muzungu 
communicated an important message regarding the necessity of caution and silence in 
post-genocide Rwanda, for foreigners researchers and Rwandans alike.  
Taken together, the process of analyzing these iconic stories reveals much about the 
tensions being negotiated by Rwandans in their everyday, post-genocide lives. But 
something is potentially lost in this analysis as well: namely, the democratizing potential 
of oral historical practice. By contextualizing these iconic stories in relation to the wider 
personal, social, economic, and political climates in which they are being reproduced, the 
researcher risks overwhelming these iconic stories with analysis, obscuring WKHQDUUDWRU¶V
intended purpose. This concern does not change the fact that such contextualization and 
analysis is a necessity in post-genocide Rwanda where it is difficult for ordinary 
Rwandans to speak about their experiences of the genocide and related mass atrocities, as 
well as Rwandan history, more generally, in a manner WKDWPLJKWFRQWUDGLFWWKH53)¶V
official history, given the authorities¶WHQGHQF\WRLQWHUSUHWVXFKDFWV as an attempt to 
delegitimize the current regime.  
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However, analysis of iconic stories like those discussed above can over time create space 
for public discussion of lived experiences that are impossible to voice in post-genocide 
Rwanda by maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of the participants. In this sense, 
the democratizing potential of oral history is being maintained to some extent precisely 
because it allows for a multiplicity of voices in a setting where such opportunities are 
typically few and far between. As argued by Erin Baines and Beth Stewart (2011), 
storytelling is an essentially social act that can contribute to restoring social equilibrium 
in transitional societies, particularly when conducted in a culturally appropriate and safe 
environment. Bringing iconic stories into conversation in a safe space, making them 
accessible to Rwandans from a range of backgrounds, and highlighting the different 
meanings intended by different actors can facilitate understanding and ultimately, social 
UHSDLUDPRQJ5ZDQGDQV)RUDVDVVHUWHGE\9HHQD'DVDQG$UWKXU.OHLQPDQ³>I@LQGLQJ
RQH¶VYRLFHLQWKHPDNLQJRIRQH¶VKLVWRU\WKHUHPDNLQJRIDZRUOG«LVDOVRDPDWWHURI
being able to re-contextualize the narratives of devastation and generate new contexts 
WKURXJKZKLFKHYHU\GD\OLIHPD\EHFRPHSRVVLEOH´8QGHUWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
perhaps an appropriate practice going forward would be for ethnographers, oral 
historians, and related practitioners who work in conflicted and post-conflict 
communities to challenge iconic stories and collective memories, more generally, to 
better expose their underlying dynamic, multiple, shared and contested natures and 
prevent the replication of overly simplistic narratives that might otherwise serve to 
deepen, rather than diminish, lingering divisions within communities and nations. 
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1 For excellenWRYHUYLHZVRIWKH³FRQVWUXFWLRQRIFROOHFWLYHPHPRU\´VHH)DUKDW
6KDK]DG¶VDUWLFOHRQ³&ROOHFWLYHPHPRULHVDFRPSOH[FRQVWUXFWLRQ´DQG
-HIIUH\2OLFN¶V³¶&ROOHFWLYHPHPRU\¶DPHPRLUDQGSURVSHFW´ 
2 The term génocidaire, while rooted in the French word génocideur, is distinctly 
Rwandan and references those individuals who committed crimes during the genocide. In 
everyday usage, the term implies Hutu ethnicity, though legally, any Rwandan can be 
prosecuted for genocide-related crimes. 
3 The most thorough and historically sound overview of the events that occurred during 
WKHJHQRFLGHLV$OLVRQ'HV)RUJHV¶Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda 
(1999).  
4 Controversy has emerged over which parties to the conflict are responsible for 
+DE\DULPDQD¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQ6RRQDIWHU+DE\DULPDQD¶VGHDWKD%HOJLDQMRXUQDOLVW
reported that two French soldiers were responsible for the assassination, while Etienne 
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Sengegera, the Rwandan ambassador to the DRC alleged that Belgian peacekeepers were 
to blame (Prunier, 1997: 213-214)53)VXSSRUWHUVDOOHJHWKDW+DE\DULPDQD¶VLQQHUFLUFOH
had him assassinated following his decision to sign the Arusha Accords because they felt 
he had betrayed the Hutu cause (Des Forges, 1999: 182). In 2010, the Rwandan 
government released the Mutsinzi Report (Republic of Rwanda, 2010), which argues that 
the Rwandan Armed Forces were responsible for engineering and implementing 
+DE\DULPDQD¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQ7KHVHILQGLQJVZHUHORRVHO\FRQILUPHGE\WKHSUHOLPLQDU\
Trévidic report (7UpGLYLF and Poux, 2012), though critics have noted that both the 
Mutsinzi and Trévidic reports failed to take into consideration the testimonies of ex-RPF 
FRPEDWDQWVZKRFODLP.DJDPHZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRURUFKHVWUDWLQJ+DE\DULPDQD¶V
assassination (Schofield, 2012). To this end, Andrè Guichaoua, a sociologist and former 
expert witness for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), has concluded 
based on evidence collected and verified by ICTR prosecutors that the RPF was most 
likely resSRQVLEOHIRU+DE\DULPDQD¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQ*XLFKDRXD2015: 144-145). 
5 The number of victims of the genocide is similarly controversial, with conservative 
estimates by the international community maintaining that between 400,000 and 800,000 
Rwandan civilians died, and generous estimates promoted by the RPF arguing that over 
one million Tutsi died. This paper uses the moderate estimate suggested by Alison Des 
Forges (1999: 15-16).  
6 First responders to the genocide included journalists like Philip Gourevitch (1998) and 
Fergal Keane (1995) who gained access to regions of Rwanda that had been overrun and 
VWDELOL]HGE\WKH53)7KHVHMRXUQDOLVWV¶SUR[LPLW\WR53)WURRSVDQGSROLWLFDOHOLWHV
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resulted in a host of pro-RPF reports and articles that were largely uncritical of the human 
rights abuses perpetrated by RPA soldiers in their efforts to take control of the nation.  
7 For positive accounts of post-JHQRFLGH5ZDQGDVHH6WHSKHQ.LQ]HU¶VA thousand hills 
(2008) and %LOO&OLQWRQ¶V%%&LQWHUYLHZLQZKLFKKHLPSOLHVWKDW5ZDQGD¶V
KHDYLO\FULWLFL]HGKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGLVOHVVLPSRUWDQWJLYHQ5ZDQGD¶VVWHOODU
development progress. 
8 Amnesty International (2012, 2011, 2010) and Human Rights Watch (2011, 2010a) are 
the most outspoken NGO critics of the .DJDPHUHJLPH¶VKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGIn 
addition, scholars such as Alison Des Forges (1999), Paul Gready (2011), Aloys 
Habimana (2011), Bert Ingelaere (2011), Timothy Longman (2011), Johan Pottier (2002), 
Filip Reyntjens (2015, 2006, 2004), Susan Thomson (2011a; 2010; 2009) and Lars 
:DOGRUIKDYHSURYLGHGFRQVWDQWDQDO\VLVRI5ZDQGD¶VJUDGXDOO\ZRUVHQLQJKXPDQ
rights record. The Kagame regime has responded that human rights can only come after 
the achievement of political stability and development²that there is no hope for long-
term peace in Rwanda without a higher standard of living and education for all 
Rwandans.  
9 My focus on rural Rwandans was largely influenced by the work of David and 
Catharine Newbury (2000).  
10 Jennie Burnet has introduced thHWHUPµDPSOLILHGVLOHQFH¶LQUHIHUHQFHWRWKHµLQWHQVH
SXEOLFVLOHQFH¶WKDWH[LVWVµVXUURXQGLQJ53)-perpetrated violence experienced by 
5ZDQGDQVRIDOOHWKQLFLWLHV¶ 
11 The term génocidaire is distinctly Rwandan and refers to those individuals who 
committed atrocities during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In common usage, it is often 
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treated as synonymous with the Hutu majority. For more information on the initial 
research project associated with this article, see my forthcoming book and related 
publications (Jessee, 2016; Jessee, 2015; Jessee, 2012; Jessee, 2011; Jessee and Watkins 
2014).  
12 This label is a relatively recent addition to public discourse on the genocide in Rwanda, 
and the Rwandan government and a handful of Rwandan civil society organizations have 
been lobbying to have adopted by the international community. In 2014, Olivier 
1GXKXQJLUHKH5ZDQGD¶VGHSXW\SHUPDQHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWRWKH81DQQRXQFHGDPDMRU
victory of this campaign after the 816HFXULW\&RXQFLOUHIHUHQFHGµthe 1994 genocide of 
the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others were killed¶LQ5esolution 2136 on 
the DRC (Gahiji, 2014; Kagire, 2014; UN Security Council, 2014). 
13 In fact, the lived realities of Hutu civilians surrounding the genocide were far more 
complex. There is a plethora of literature detailing the RPF-perpetrated mass atrocities 
endured by Hutu civilians, beginning with the RPA invasion of northern Rwanda in 1990 
and extending into the post-genocide period (Des Forges, 1999; Umutesi, 2004; UN, 
2010/LNHZLVHWKHUHLVDPSOHHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDW+XWXFLYLOLDQV¶DFWLRQV
surrounding the genocide was more varied that acknowledged by the current official 
narrative (Conway, 2011; Jefremovas, 1995; Jessee, 2015; Waldorf, 2009). 
14 During the genocide, it was common practice in some communities for the Hutu Power 
extremists to separate Tutsi women, children and the elderly²those who were physically 
weak²and give them to Hutu women and children to kill (Des Forges, 1999). This 
practice ensured widespread complicity in the massacres.  
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15 Signatories to the 1948 UN Genocide Convention are legally obligated to intervene to 
SUHYHQWDQGSXQLVKJHQRFLGHGHILQHGDVµDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJDFWVFRPPLWWHGZLWKLQWHQW
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) 
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
JURXS¶81*HQRFLGH&RQYHQWLRQ$UWLFOH,, 
16 Certain acts of violence, if perpetrated during the genocide, carry automatic life 
sentences as Category 4 crimes (Tertsakian, 2008). For this reason, génocidaires often 
refused to speak about sexual violence, the murder of children, and other highly criminal 
atrocities.  
17 Despite the JpQRFLGDLUHV¶ unwillingness to acknowledge violence against children, 
Alison Des Forges (1999) and Human Rights Watch (2003), among others, have 
documented hundreds of cases across Rwanda that indicate violence against children was 
widespread.  
18 Ingando refers to reeducation camps for confessed génocidaires and other criminals 
who are about to be returned to their communities (Thomson, 2011b). Gacaca is a 
dispute resolution mechanism reinvented by the RPF in the post-genocide period to help 
reduce the burden of the  estimated 140,000 accused génocidaires awaiting trial 
(Ingelaere, 2007, Thomson and Nagy 2011).  
19 Valérie Bemeriki insisted that I use her real name when referencing our conversations. 
Otherwise, pseudonyms are used throughout this article to maintain my parWLFLSDQWV¶DQG
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UHVHDUFKDVVLVWDQWV¶FRQILGHQWLDOLW\,QDGGLWLRQ,UHIUDLQIURPLQFOXGLQJSHUVRQDOO\
identifying information about my participants. 
20 Conversely, the RPF claims their invasion was motivated by their determination to 
force the Habyarimana regime into a power-sharing agreement that would end the system 
of anti-Tutsi discrimination and oppression, and permit Tutsi refugees of previous periods 
of ethnic and political violence to return to Rwanda. 
21 Several scholars have noted the prevalence of an inferiority complex internalized by 
Hutu men and women, which during the genocide resulted in Tutsi women being subject 
WRSDUWLFXODUO\EUXWDOIRUPVRIWRUWXUHDQGPXUGHULQWHQGHGWRµGLPLQLVK¶WKHP7KLV
LQIHULRULW\FRPSOH[LVURRWHGLQWKHµ+DPLWLFK\SRWKHVLV¶PDGHSRSXODULQ5ZDQGDGXULQJ
WKHFRORQLDOSHULRGZKLFKFHOHEUDWHGWKH7XWVL¶VDOOHJHG&DXFDVLDQKHULWDJHDV
descendants of the biblical figure Ham, and granted them disproportionate access to 
educational opportunities and power on the grounds they were more intelligent, well-
mannered and attractive than their Hutu and Twa compatriots (Baines, 2003, Des Forges, 
1999, Taylor, 2001). 
22 Christopher Taylor (2001) and Liisa Malkki (1995) have offered more detailed 
symbolic analysis of impalement in the context of the 1994 genocide. 
23 This position contradicts accounts established by notable historians like Alison Des 
Forges (2011), Catharine Newbury (1988), and Jan Vansina (2004), who provide an 
image of pre-colonial Rwanda, particularly under the Nyaginya, as engaged in aggressive 
territorial expansion, creating a range of regional tensions from overt warfare to more 
subtle political struggles.  
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24 Catharine Newbury has argued that ubuhake, which could occur between any Rwandan 
patron and a client regardless of ethnicity, was actually far less divisive than the more 
widespread practice of uburetwa, a form of corvée labour whereby Hutu civilians 
worked, paid taxes, and gave a portion of their crops to a Tutsi landholder in exchange 
for access to land (Newbury, 1980: 100; see also Vansina, 2004: 134). 
25 Paul Kagame is actually descended from the Abakagera lineage of the Abega clan, 
which as a matridynastic clan, still connotes elite status in Rwandan society. 
26 Much like the RPF, Kayibanda and Habyarimana engaged in historical revisionism 
during their rule. However, the official narratives under Kayibanda and Habyarimana 
demonized the Tutsi as a means of distracting the Rwandan people from the corruption 
and mismanagement that characterized their tenure (Newbury, 2002). 
27 The term muzungu (pl. bazungu) is used widely used across Eastern Africa in reference 
to all foreigners, regardless of ethnicity. 
28 Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Susan Thomson (2011: 430) have made similar 
REVHUYDWLRQVQRWLQJWKDWERWKUHJLPHVKDYHUHOLHGXSRQDQLPDJHRIµEHQHYROHQW
OHDGHUVKLS¶WRZLQRYHUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DQGGLVFLSOLQHWKH5ZDQGDQ
population. 
29 To date, only a handful of researchers, including the late Alison Des Forges, René 
Lemarchand and Filip Reyntjens, have been formally declared persona non grata in 
Rwanda. However, several researchers have reported encountering difficulties with 
returning to Rwanda to continue their research after they published work that was critical 
of Kagame and the RPF (ASA, 2012, HRW, 2012b, Jessee, 2013), and in 2015 the 
Commission for the Fight to Prevent Genocide allegedly published a list of those 
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researchers, journalists and other professionals that it considered persona non grata due 
to their alleged involvement in promoting genocide denial (Democracy in Rwanda Now, 
2015). 
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